Book Information

Book ID Asin: B009S33I68
Book Title: We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam
Book Author: Harold G. Moore,Joseph L. Galloway
Book Format and Price:
Book Format Name: Kindle
Book Format Price: $7.13
Book Format Name: Audiobook
Book Format Price: $0.00
Book Format Name: Hardcover
Book Format Price: $26.10
Book Format Name: Paperback
Book Format Price: $14.85
Book Format Name: MassMarket Paperback
Book Format Price: $8.99
Book Format Name: AudioCD
Book Format Price: $30.46
Book Price: $7.13
Book Category: Kindle Store, Kindle eBooks, History and unknown
Book Rating: 3,527 ratings

Book Product Detail

• Best Sellers Rank: #45,033 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
  • #12 in United States Veterans History
  • #23 in Vietnam War History (Kindle Store)
  • #25 in United States Military Veterans History

• Customer Reviews:
  4.7 out of 5 stars 3,527 ratings

unknown

Book Review

Name: Paul R. McGuire
Rating: 4.0 out of 5 stars
Title: Much Better Than the Movie
Date: Reviewed in the United States on August 24, 2018
Review: We Were Soldiers Once…and Young
Ia Drang – the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam
by Lt. Gen. Harold G Moore
and Joseph L. Galloway

First of all, Mel Gibson owes a lot of people, including General Moore, a huge apology for his movie version of the book. However, if you have seen the movie, the photo journalist played by Barry Pepper is Joseph Galloway who, like Moore, was there for the first half of the battle. As Gibson saw it, the only people whose lives much mattered were officers. When an officer gets pooped, the scene switches back to Ft. Benning and the sorrow of the officer wives. To be sure, they suffered as much as anyone and deserve our empathy, but in Gibson’s world, enlisted men died anonymously, and their memories aren’t worth spit. I was afraid the book would be the same, but Moore and Galloway sound a lot like Ernie Pyle in that every man mentioned, enlisted and officer, gets a brief sketch that involves at least his age and hometown. There is a chapter that traces the subsequent histories of a few families of the dead, enlisted and officer as well. The first part of the book is several pages listing all the dead from both halves of the battle, a nice tribute, I thought. The book has ample maps, and, unusual for a Kindle edition, they were expandable for more detail.
Early in the Viet Nam war, some military thinkers and President Kennedy endorsed the idea of helicopter borne soldiers who could land right in the middle of the enemy and begin the fight from the get go. Later, the concept was called vertical envelopment, and it was adopted by more than just the First Air Cavalry Division. The 1st Air Cav was the first, however. All the rest of the grunts, including the Marines in the north, were mostly on foot. Choppers were used to ferry them about, but they did not yet attack from the air or land in the face of the enemy. Probably, they should have called them the 1st Air Dragoons. As part of the program, the army resurrected a few old cavalry regiments, including Custer’s 7th. Their song was “The Garry Owen,” and “Garry Owen!” was used as an affirmative, an acknowledgement or a greeting. Other revived regiments adopted black Stetsons and handlebar mustaches. Maybe that part of “Apocalypse Now!” wasn’t far off the mark. They were a newly created, elite unit, and their swagger announced it. They trained intensively for their mission, were then blindsided by newly inaugurated President Johnson’s reluctance to go completely to war. Before the division deployed to Viet Nam, Johnson declined to extend enlistments for the duration, and the division arrived in country badly under strength as many of these highly trained soldiers were discharged at the end of their enlistments. Later, in the second half of the battle of the Ia Drang, things got worse when these airborne troops were so shorted on their training that they got only one helicopter ride, but never trained in assault from them.
The battle of the Ia Drang is divided neatly into two parts, each named after its primary landing zone, LZ, the first part being X-ray and the second being Albany. Moore was a lieutenant colonel and commander of a battalion. Using aerial reconnaissance, and maps, Moore selected LZ X-ray as the place to assault and to meet the North Vietnamese army who were deeply dug in to the Cho Pong massif, just east of the Cambodian border. Cambodia, of course, was off limits to U. S. and, by extension to ARVN troops as well, and there was no doctrine of hot pursuit. Johnson wanted to keep the fiction of Cambodian neutrality and would not allow pursuit across the border, no matter how hot. NVA and VC could cross the border and thumb their noses. Many in the U. S. high command objected strongly to such restrictions, but, as one administration official, William Bundy I think, rightly pointed out, if we pursued twenty miles into Cambodia, the NVA would withdraw twenty-five, and so on until we needed to conquer the whole country, in which case the NVA might invade Thailand. Nixon missed the point and both invaded and bombed Cambodia, setting up the appallingly brutal regime of Pol Pot. The 1st Air Cav was eager to attack a much larger NVA force and show what they could do. The NVA, augmented by main force Viet Cong units, were similarly eager to fight the Americans and to discover ways to neutralize their overwhelming advantages in air power and artillery. The 1st Cav, besides inserting troops directly into battle, via Huey’s, would use Chinooks to land 105 howitzers in fire bases a safe distance away to provide pin point artillery. Huey gunships with four, fixed mount M-60’s, pods of 2.75” rockets, two M-60 door gunners and a 40mm cannon brought devastating close air support to troops on the ground. The Air Force provided a fixed wing fighter, the A-1E Skyraider, that was heavily armored and could carry an enormous load of bombs and napalm cannisters, as well as .50 cal. machine guns for strafing. It was for this reason that Moore’s battalion was confident of victory, despite being criminally short handed. After they landed, the NVA threw everything they had at the Americans. There was no lack of heroism among the NVA, and they kept coming into hellish fire until, after about fifty hours, they were forced to withdraw. Mel Gibson’s heroic, bayonet charge failed to materialize.
The second part of the battle, Albany, took place a day or two later. The ill equipped, ill trained battalion was sent in to replace Moore’s battle worn battalion, and, after policing the battlefield for American bodies and weapons, both NVA and American, they were, for unclear reasons, ordered to march from X-ray to Albany for extraction. They were exhausted from lack of sleep and from working at X-ray, and, not expecting much from a defeated enemy, were strung out in column of march without much in the way of flanking forces or recon. The NVA had two fresh battalions, and they attacked the column, attempting and succeeding in splitting it into isolated islands of defense. They were so close in, that they neutralized the American superiority in air and artillery fire power, both of which, from an inexcusable, command malfeasance, were late in coming. Eventually, they withdrew, and the Americans, after heavy loss, were able to exfiltrate on helicopters. Americans called it a victory, but I think the greater claim to victory was with the NVA. Their motive in fighting was to learn how to neutralize this new American power, and they did. They also pretty much forced President Johnson to accept a much wider war, one they knew they could probably win the way the beat the French: make battle losses unacceptable to the American electorate. In both halves of the battle, the cowardice of the Medevac choppers whose pilots would not approach a hot LZ was notable. Medevacs were performed mostly by 1st Cav choppers who, under terrific, enemy fire, would first unload supplies and then load bodies and wounded.
In Moore’s analysis, I think he agreed that the war was unwinnable, that it was going to be long and bloody, and that in the end, America would have to declare victory and go home. He ends with a quotation from Clausewitz to the effect that it’s stupid to begin a war if you don’t first define the conditions of victory. I’m not going to analyze the war here, that’s beyond the scope of this essay, but I think our loss is abundantly clear, and it becomes increasingly clear with every new analysis. The valor of the troops didn’t lose the war, but the indecision of the politicians did. Kennedy bears the bulk of the blame for our involvement, and to him much be assigned the burden of the loss. If he had ever read his Clausewitz, he either forgot it or failed to pay attention. What’s even worse is that our current crop of leaders is just as woefully ignorant of the folly of indecisive war as was the last.
I am impressed by General Moore. During the battle, General Westmoreland, commander of U. S. forces in Viet Nam, wanted Moore to leave his troops and fly to Saigon to give a briefing. Moore refused. Later in the war, as a brigade commander, Westmoreland replaced him as commander, because they had a policy of rotating officers on a fixed schedule. Moore, being in the middle of the battle and seeing the insanity of turning over command at that time, didn’t relinquish command until the battle was over, ten days later. He began each chapter with an apt quotation, often from past military leaders, such as W. T. Sherman, or from classical sources, often Shakespeare’s kings. One of them, though, was unattributed, and I hope it was Moore’s own: dulce bellum inexpertis. For that one, he gave the translation: “War is delightful only to those who haven’t experienced it.” I just checked it (should have done that first) and it’s by Pindar, but it was made common by Erasmus. I don’t know how much of the book was written by Moore and how much by Galloway. Galloway was a journalist, so I suppose most of the prose is his, but it’s hard to tell. Excellent book, and much better than I expected. Still waiting, though, for Gibson’s mea culpa. Maybe after the truly godawful “Hacksaw Ridge,” he thinks he’s done damage enough.

Name: Jeffrey T. Bochonok
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: great book
Date: Reviewed in the United States on September 9, 2022
Review: Tells an amazing story. You feel like you are in the battle with the soldiers. Kept me wanting to turn the page at the end of each chapter.

Name: Richard C. Geschke
Rating: 5.0 out of 5 stars
Title: From this Valley Onward, All Hell Would Break Loose!!!
Date: Reviewed in the United States on July 7, 2012
Review: "It was early March of 1970, and the weather was damp with a trace of snow on the ground. Since I had no means of transportation, I walked around the bend of Wurzburger Strasse in the early morning mist of a drab Monday morning. I walked onto Graves Kaserne, which housed the entire First Battalion, Seventh Infantry unit; I was heading to meet Lieutenant Colonel Dillon, the battalion commander. All incoming officers must report formally to the commander, and they have to endure the traditional "Welcome-to-the-greatest-unit-in-the-army" soliloquy." These words come directly from my book I co-authored with my army buddy Bob Toto titled "In Our Duffel Bags, Surviving the Vietnam Era."
The significance of the above paragraph is that Colonel Dillon was the S-3 officer for LTC Moore's 1st of the 7th Cav. At the time of the Battle of the Ia Drang it was November, 1965. Fast forward four and a half years later; Lieutenant Colonel Gregory P. (Matt) Dillon had command of the 1st of the 7th Infantry which was part of the 3rd Infantry Division located in the Zone of West Germany. Since writing our war memoirs I've since been reading a lot of material on the Vietnam War, after forgetting most of it for over forty years. I never knew that my commanding battalion officer was a very instrumental and heroic officer at LZ Xray.
First of all, the very concept prior to the battle of the Ia Drang Valley of air mobile assault was an untested theory. After the battle it became doctrine written in stone as how to conduct operations in Vietnam. The troopers of the 7th Cav were trained in the techniques of airmobile assault at Fort Benning Georgia. Their uniforms which signified the typical fatigues that were worn in CONUS (Continental US) Europe and Korea shows to all that this unit was one of the first units to go to Southeast Asia. The basecamps erected by the 1st Cav Division looked to be temporary tent cities very reminiscent of WWII temporary camps. Later on in the war the base camps would be made heavily sandbagged structures complete with outhouse latrines and rainwater showers. The uniforms would also change drastically and the troopers would be wearing the lighter weighted jungle fatigues and the newly designed canvas upper jungle boots.
The troopers of the 1st of the 7th Cav would be led by the highly competent LTC Harold G. Moore. These troopers were well trained and Moore's officers were of a very high level. Their mission was what was to be a familiar phrase to all infantry officers who served in South Vietnam and it was to "search and destroy the enemy." The enemy was found soon after landing at LZ Xray. This LZ had the capabilities of holding 8 slicks when landing and extracting troops and equipment. Moore and Galloway tell the brutal story of how they held the LZ for three days and were able to direct in field artillery and air support on the surrounding NVA. The 7th Cav with a force of about 450 men were able to hold off an NVA force of 2500 men. Using the choppers for support and medevac operations the 7th Cav proved to all that they could indeed contain and beat the forces of the well trained NVA.
The stories told herein, show the professionalism and heroics of not only the lst Cav but also gets into the mindset of the North Vietnamese. It shows the true dedication of the revolution techniques of the North Vietnamese. As well as the Americans fought in Vietnam the North Vietnamese knew that we would tire of it. In fact General Moore faced these facts way back in the early days of 1965. He knew that the North Vietnamese were a tough and savvy opponent and that the US severely constrained themselves by not going and pursuing the enemy when they escaped to Cambodia. The war as fought with these so-called rules could never be won. Moore understood this early on.
This book represents many things. It shows to us that the US brought air mobility to the battlefield. It showed to all that it could maneuver from above the tough jungle terrain of Vietnam. Something the French lacked was the ability to maneuver, so they lost on the battlefield. The US did not lose on the battlefield, however as Ho Chi Minh knew we would tire of the war no matter how many of the North Vietnamese and VC we Americans killed. So therefore we left the battlefield in 1973 and the weak ARVN were left to their own devices, which I may add we supplied them. They quickly lost these devices and they indeed lost the war in 1975.
Moore's book is a classic which shows the brutality and yes some of the senseless management of men at war. Moore and Galloway show respect to the troopers who fought in that war and they convey what the effects of that major battle were and how the Vietnam War was to be fought in the future. It also shows our hubris and tragic decisions which led to the ultimate tragedy that was the Vietnam War. This book should be read by all who want to know about the battle, the Vietnam War and perhaps how to prevent such tragedies in the future.

Home | Contact  | Disclaimer | Privacy Policy | DMCA